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Caesar's or God's: The Coin of Religious
Liberty and Generally Applicable
Statutes
Lyle Stamps
Abstract

The rise of the regulatory welfare-state and
expansion of civil liberties has created tension between
the jurisprudence of the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause. While both clauses seek to
maximize religious liberty, their disparate rejoinders on
acceptable governmental action create a nexus of
conflicting baselines. This conflictual nexus of
jmispruclence requires consideration of both clauses
when deciding the permissibility of governmental action.
In this sense, religious liberty is a coin with two distinct
faces that produce different policy outcomes.
Historical Background

The Founding Fathers of the American Constitution
were deeply concerned about religious liberty in their
newly founded republic. They enshrined dual protections
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within the First Amendment to the Constitution, commonly
known as the free exercise and est3blishment clauses, to
ensure religious liberty. The free exercise clause
prohibited the national government from enacting laws
infringing upon an individual's right to practice his
religion. The establishment clause prohibited the creation
of a nation-wide state-sponsored monopolistic church.
Recently, these two clauses have been at cross-ends
with each other. The conflict stems from two sources: the
expansion of the regulatoty welfare-state and the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights to state and local laws.
First, as the scope of governmental activities has
expanded, social policies have begun to infringe upon the
exercise of religious rights. Such policies are thought to
violate the free exercise clause. Second, as the two
clauses have been applied to state laws, religious
minorities have challenged state policies as enforcing a de
facto establishment of religion. The inevitable result of
broadening both the scope of acceptable governmental
activities while concurrently increasing the depth and
breadth of individual civil liberties is conflict.
Accommodationist Free Exercise vs. Separatist
Establishment Jurisprudence

When social policy limits religious actions, the two
clauses divide civil libertarians into distinct camps:
accommodationists vs. separatists (Walcl 82).
Accommocbtionists believe that while there should be no
official state-sponsored religion, the government is bound
to allow the greatest possible expression of individual
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religious liberty, even in the face of contraty legislation.
They draw suppott from the sanction given to religion by
the early American presidents, namely Washington,
Jefferson, and Madison <Cousins 137).
Separatists believe that the state must maintain a
literal interpretation of Jefferson's "wall of separation," by
prohibiting any and all forms of governmental aid to
religion. They oppose the use of public funds for any
type of religious activity and believe that the state can
pass laws infringing upon the exercise of religious beliefs
(Tatalovich and Daynes 136). Justice Hugo Black iterated
this stance in El'erson u. Board of Education "Neither [a
state nor the Federal government] can pass laws which aid
one religion, aiel all religions, or prefer one religion over
another .. (330 U.S. 1). Public funding or accommodation
is thus seen as a direct subsidy that encourages religious
participation and violates the establishment clause.
The conflict between acconm1odationist and
separatist jurisprudence on the First Amendment has
created a nexus of conflict between the free exercise and
establishment clauses. In this nexus, governmental policy
is labeled as "suspect" and scrutinized under two
contradictory premises. Accomoclationist jurisprudence
requires that gove rnment give preference to religious
belief and expression or face strict judicial scrutiny to
assure that religious exercise is not being "chilled."
Separatist jurisprudence requires courts to give strict
scrutiny to any law that makes specific exemptions for
religion to assure that government is not "establishing" any
religion.
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Generally Applicable Content Neutral Statutes:
Clausal and Conflicting Nexus
The difficulty of modern religious liberty
jurisprudence in reconciling the mandates of both the free
exercise and establishment clauses i::; best exemplified in
the current argument over generally applicable content
neutral statutes (Tatalovich and Daynes 157). Such a
statute is broad in scope and specifically avoids textual
mention of any specific group or type of individuals that
might be affected. Zoning, drug policy, and bankmptcy
are three specific examples of generally applicable content
neutral statutes.
The accomodationist-separatist jurisprudential split
creates problems for public officials. For example, vvhen
the national, state, or local government creates or modifies
an existing general statute, how should they craft the
language? If the zoning law specifically exempts
churches, then separatists claim a violation of the
establishment clause. Hmvever, when a church is
prohibited from expansion due to a zoning ordinance, the
church can file an accomodationist su it claiming the
ordinance violates the free exercise clause. Public officials
look to the judicial system to provide clear information on
how to resolve the dispute 057).

Yodel, Verner, and Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court established strict scrutiny as the
judicial standard of review for generally applicable laws in
conflict with religious liberties. In the landmark cases of
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Wisconsin L'. Yodel, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Sherbert l'.
Verner, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court established that
states could discriminate against citizens in violation of
education or welfare laws due to religious belief. In
Yodel, the Court established that the state could not force
mandatory attendance in public school for Amish children.
In Verner; the Court established that an Adventist woman
was entitled to welfare benefits despite having turned
clown employment requiring her to violate her Sabbath
belief practices.
The standard of applying strict scrutiny to generally
applicable laws prevented national, state, and local
governments from using content neutral statutes to
discriminate against specific minorities and religious
groups. By requiring governmental proof of a compelling
state interest to infringe or penalize religiously motivated
belief, religion was given a high and strong judicial
protection.

A Weakened Standard: The "Incidental Effect" of
Smith
In 1990, the Supreme Court lowered the judicial
standard of review for free exercise challenges to
generally applicable la\vs in Employn1ent Division of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, a deeply
divided Court voted 5-4 to abandon the compelling state
interest test associated with strict scrutiny. The post-Smith
world of religious freedom saw states with a substantially
greater power to regulate social policy, even when this
regulation infringed or penalized religious belief.
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While separatists were pleased with the verd ict,
former Solicitor General Rex E. Lee stated the
accomodationist viewpoint saying "the majority sttmned
nearly every student of constimtionallaw by announcing a
quite clit1erent approach to the adjudication of free
exercise cases''(Lee 84). Lee was surprised that instead of
affirming the Oregon drug law as a ''compelling'' state
interest, the Court had opted to strike down the standard
altogether. Separatists were less troubled, seeing the
decision as a validation of the state's inability to grant
exemptions to religious practices that violate statutory
laws.
The Cou rt's intent to maintain the relaxed standard
of review was reaffirmed by the 1993 case of Lukumi
Babalu Aye Inc. u. Ci~)l ofHialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 0993).
On the surface, this case cast the Court as a defender of
religious free exercise by striking down the Hialeah law.
However, the law was struck down because it explicitly
mentioned the Santeria practice of animal sacrifice as its
encl. This implicitly left the door open for other cities to
enact content neutral laws that would be generally
applicable throughout the city. Under the Smith standard,
Hialeah and other cities can now enact religiously
discriminato1y legislation under the guise of a generally
applicable and content neutral statute.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Boerne v.
Flores

Within six months of the Smith decision, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act CRFRA) had been
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introduced to overturn Smith :S statutory decision and
restore the compelling interest test. By 1993, Congress
had united to pass (RFRA), with only three dissenting
votes in the Senate. Religious rights advocates celebrated
and RFRA was signed by President Clinton in a large and
public ceremony. The passage of RFRA enabled religious
activists to bring suit against all levels of government that
infringed upon the exercise of religious practices.
However, RFRA only lasted four years. In 1997, the
Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the
states in the case of Ci~y of Boerne u. Archbishop Flores,
117 S.Ct. 2157 0997). The case centered around the
rejected application by Flores for a building permit.
Rejected due to a local zoning law regarding historical
structures, Flores challenged the law under RFRA. The
Court decided that the law overstepped Congresses power
to regulate the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, RFRA was left intact as applied to federal
legislation.
Post-Boerne Religious Liberty

Unlike the Smith decision, Boerne took the issue of
free exercise jurisprudence from the statutory to the
constitutional realm. This action by the Court
strengthened its position vis-a-vis further Congressional
action. This strategy has been largely successful. Support
for overturning Boerne has been weak and the consensus
of Congress divided before a more decisive Court. First, a
partisan Republican group tried and failed to pass the
Religious Liberty Amendment. Second, individual states
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have begun to pass their own state-level versions of RFRA
which restore the compelling interest standard to state and
local laws (these states include Rhode Island, Connecticut,
California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Georgia and
Michigan). Third, a bipartisan coalition has begun to pass
smalle r piecemeal legislation to protect specific religio us
rights. In response to this effort, Congress passed the
Religious Charitable Protection Act, which provided an
accomodationist exemption for religious contributio ns
from federal bankruptcy laws.

Divided Jurisprudence: A Constitutional Lesson
Both the Smith a re Boerne decisions mark the
Court's difficulty in separating the free exercise and
establishment clauses. An examination of the majority a nd
dissenting opinions in both cases revea l a set of opposing
justices who both appeal to the same historical justifica tion
for thei r desired result. The result of each case turns upo n
the Court's decision to place the case under either the free
exercise or establishment clauses. However, the use of
generally applicable content neutral statutes has blurred
the line between the two.
Should government accommodate religious
practices that violate generally applicable laws? If
government does, it will also be providing an implicit
subsidy and approval for the religious practices exempted.
The Court's failure to provide strong gu idance will
continue to spur a stream of litigation brought by re ligious
claimants trying to pra ctice their religious beliefs despite
the attempts o f governme ntal laws to limit the free
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exercise of religion .
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